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Continuity and Rupture in "New Approaches to
Comparative Law"*
Paolo G. Carozza2
In the course of this conference on "new approaches to comparative law;" it has struck me as curious that so little has been said
about the "old" approaches to comparative law. In such a self-conscious effort to distinguish ourselves from our predecessors, one
would expect at least some articulation of distinctive criteria, if not
a full-fledged manifesto of novelty. Giinter Frankenberg gave us
three ideal-type identities of the comparative lawyer;1 David Kennedy boxed up the old approaches in his taxonomical chart.2 They
and others have referred to the expansion of capitalist market economics and liberal democratic political structures as the materialist
catalyst for opportunities to "deploy" comparative law. But while
these may help explain the sources of renewed interest in comparative law, they have not on the whole addressed what makes the
current examples of comparative legal scholarship "new" in approach.
Perhaps this is just evidence that the "new approaches" are not
really all that new after all. Cole Durham, for instance, remarked
that what he read largely consisted of excellent examples of comparative law within the discipline's existing terms of reference. In this
view, perhaps our appeal to "new approaches" is simply the vanity
and ambition of the young. We construct the old approaches just as
the juristes inquiets constructed l'Ecole de l'Exeg~se.' In the peren-
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nial dynamic of the academy, we validate ourselves as new scholars
with the frisson that comes from rebellion against the tradition, not
dynamic continuity within it. Then again, maybe the New Approaches constitute such a radical break from "old" comparative law
that we cannot even meaningfully speak of a continuity of discourse
at all. There is a hint of this rupture in the several protestations we
heard throughout the weekend from authors like Brenda Cossman
who insisted that they had never even thought of themselves as
comparatists at all until their friends recently persuaded them
otherwise.4 With outsiders thus colonizing the discipline perhaps
the discontinuity is too great to warrant paying attention to the distinguishing features of the New Approaches. In fact, however, I
think that the distinctive characteristics of the New Approaches we
have seen at this conference reflect different degrees of both continuity and rupture with the traditional discipline of comparative
law.
In contrast to most traditional comparative law conferences and
presentations, the New Approaches did not limit themselves to
expositions on some technical doctrinal legal points. Instead of setting forth, say, the requirements for the formation of leasing contracts in Continental European and Anglo-American law, the discussions here tended to address broad themes and critiques of law,
comparative jurisprudential approaches, or trends in the uses of
comparative legal methods. As refreshing as this is, however, it is
consistent with preexisting movement in the discipline of comparative law. For some time, comparatists have been moving away from
the sterile statements of formal doctrine to wide-ranging inquiries
on questions of law and society, and in doing so have been bringing
into comparative perspective entire areas of law and jurisprudential
approaches previously beyond the comparatist's gaze.5
A related development is the expansion of comparative studies
in geographic terms. The New Approaches welcomed studies involving India, Latin America, and Fiji into the conversation of
comparatists, reaching far beyond the U.S. comparatists' stereotypical preoccupation with Europe and the civil law/common law distinction. But again, in spite of Frank Upham's convincing description of the marginalization of Japanese legal studies from the comparative law mainstream,6 the trend toward broader geographic in-

4. See Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself Comparative Law,
Feminist Legal Studies, and the PostcolonialProject, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 525.
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary
Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 385.
6. See Frank K. Upham, The Place of Japanese Legal Studies in American
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quiry has been an important dynamic of traditional comparative law
for a long time. The Paris Congress of Comparative Law of 1900
advocated limiting comparison to continental European legal systems. Systematic comparisons of civil law and common law only
began between the World Wars, and that development in turn contributed significantly to widening comparative law's vision to other
legal systems.7
Two other common characteristics of much of the work presented at this conference relate to the politics of law. On the one hand,
we heard a great deal about the internal politics of foreign law. On
the other hand, the "project" of comparative law itself was presented as a strategic political intervention. In one sense the exercises in
historical retrieval illustrated at this conference have served to
demonstrate precisely that the politics of foreign and comparative
law have been an implicit feature of comparative legal scholarship
all along. Jorge Esquirol, for instance, showed how Ren6 David's
classifications not only recognized the politics of Latin American law
but allied him with one contested vision of it in the service of-in
his view-expanding the liberal democratic European tradition s At
the same time, however, where "old approaches" may have quietly
carried the card of political affiliations, the New Approaches have
taken up the flag of politics in a clearly more self-conscious and
explicit way. This difference may be significant for reasons that I
will return to later.
Finally, and in greatest contrast to "old approaches," the approaches evident here have belatedly brought to the work of comparative law the critical tools of feminism, literary criticism, critical
theory, and postcolonial theory. It may seem odd that methods and
theories long present and developed virtually everywhere else in
legal scholarship could be even remotely considered "new approaches," but such has been the degree of comparative law's insulation
from the mainstream academy.
In what ways, then, do these characteristics, taken together,
really constitute innovation in the field? And what use are they?
Some of the conference participants' personal descriptions of their
cognitive experience of involvement in comparative projects suggest
to me that one instructive way of understanding and evaluating

Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 643.
7. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
58-62 (Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1992). Of course, this is not to say that American comparative law is no longer overly Eurocentric.
8. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (PartI), 1997
UTAH L. REV. 425.
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current developments in comparative law is by redescribing the
identities of Giinter Frankenberg's comparative lawyers according
to what we could call their epistemological posture.' To compare
things we must be able to know what they are. Different approaches
to how we know (and whether we even can know) a foreign legal
system thus represent different possible responses to the problem of
comparability. 0
Frankenberg's "mainstream" "hegemonic self' is basically a
conceptualist whose faith is in invariant, or at least critically unexamined transcultural norms.' These implicitly are rooted in fixed
logical and metaphysical foundations. 2 The "mainstreamer' is untroubled by the empirical and historical plurality of normative
frameworks and cultures. His ability to know other systems' legal
norms is thus a relatively uncomplicated matter and "comparison"
is an unproblematic weighing of the other in one's own balance. 3
By contrast, Frankenberg's "tributary-streamer" is at an
epistemological level a liberal relativist. She rejects the universalist
aspirations of the "mainstreamer" out of her "tormented" awareness
of irreconcilable epistemic, moral, and cultural differences. She
cannot even genuinely know, let alone "compare" and adjudicate
between, different legal cultures.' 4 Hence her being labeled the
"tragic comparatist.""5 Her faith in the contextualizing power of
history and culture to determine knowledge and value makes her
acutely sensitive to ethnocentrism but mired in a philosophical
skepticism that leaves her almost no way to make critical judg-

9. See Frankenberg, supra note 1. While I am not convinced that
Frankenberg's comparative lawyers ever quite exist in the pure forms described either here or in his article, use of the types is a helpful heuristic device for sorting
out the dilemmas of comparison. Note that throughout the following discussion I use
gendered pronouns in the same way that Frankenberg does in his article.
10. The following discussion is inspired in part by Michael McCarthy, Towards a
New Critical Center, Lecture at Boston College (June 1992) (transcript on file with
author).
11. Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 264 (noting "mainstreamer's" "belief in the
existence of a unitary sense of justice" and "a common order underlying the diversity
of law").
12. Indeed, Frankenberg's playfully ironic use of the metaphor of "paradise'--whether immanent, lost, or merely strange-suggests not surprisingly that the
problem of comparative law is modernity's rejection of the foundational role of religious faith. See id. at 259, 264.
13. See id. at 264-65 ("[T]he [mainstream] comparatist praises the superiority-and with it the authority--of his home law and does not even need to export
or transplant it because, wherever he goes and looks, it is always already there, if
only in a similar or dissimilar, derivative of rudimentary form.").
14. See id. at 266-67.
15. Id. at 266.
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ments about that history and culture.
To this point, Frankenberg has exposed some of the potential
failings of comparative law all too well. Caught on the horns of the
hopelessly ahistorical consciousness of the "mainstreamer" and the
unbearable paralysis of the "tributary-streamer," comparative law
would have nowhere to go.
But in fact, Frankenberg points out, the tragic comparatist has
simply transferred her faith in the source of knowledge, order, and
value from static transcultural foundations to an equally repressive
cultural and linguistic context. 6 The way out for comparative law,
then, is for the tragic comparatist to "deconstruct the hegemonic
grid" by extending her skepticism to the "conceptual repression" of
culture, and indeed of knowledge, itself." It is what Paul Ricoeur
called the "hermeneutics of suspicion." 8 In this way the
comparatist would no longer find others' prevailing cultural narratives to be obstacles to knowledge, but instead would subject them
to the same deconstructive criticism that reveals actual power dynamics in his/her own society.
Here is a possible key to the philosophical inspiration of the
New Approaches. While Frankenberg's "Professor Y" basically oscillates between the "old" comparatists' classical certainty of knowledge and relativist skepticism, the hermeneutics of suspicion allows
Frankenberg himself, as the detached, politically conscious and
ironic narrator of Professor Y's consulting adventure, to break out of
the tragic comparatist's predicament and see some small hope for
the political project of comparative law. 9 This move underscores
the significance of colonizing the discipline of comparative law with
the critical tools of feminism, literary criticism, and postcolonial

16. See id. at 266-70.
17. Id. at 270.
18. PAUL RIcOEUR, The Critique of Religion, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL
RICOEuR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HIS WORK 213, 214 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stew-

art eds. & R. Bradley DeFord trans., 1978).
With Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, a new type of critique of culture
appears.
... [Elach of them, disengaged from his narrowness, cooperates in a
general exegesis of false-consciousness and belongs by this fact in a herme-

neutics, in a theory of interpretation, under the negative form of
demystification. But with Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, beyond their
economism, biologism, and psychiatrism respectively, demystification is char-

acterized in the first place as the exercise of suspicion.
Id.; see also PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION

32-36 (Denis Savage trans., 1970).
19. See Frankenberg, supra note 1.
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theory. It certainly accounts for the explicit emphasis on the politics
of foreign law and the politics of comparative legal studies. It may
even help explain the New Approaches' greater ability to extend the
geographic and intellectual horizons of the discipline. There is no
question that it can give us new ways to revisit the basic questions
of comparative law and can generate important insights.
And yet, returning to Frankenberg's illustrative narrative, the
danger inherent in this development is precisely the slightly schizophrenic, "tragically hegemonic" predicament of Professor Y. How
he/she should judge the situation reasonably and responsibly depends on how he/she knows the Albanian legal, cultural, and political context. But if the deconstructive tools of the new comparative
law available to Professor Y were to reduce that knowledge only to
a mask for the hegemonic exercise of power, then Professor Y is in a
bind and so is comparative law. Professor Y, and we as
comparatists, would be incapable of making any normative judgments, both because we would be incapable of self-criticism and
because there would remain no norm available except power. Of
course, this doesn't stop us in actual practice from making comparative judgments. Professor Y, in both personae, does make decisions
and does act. So, we are left wondering what the implicit judgments
of Professor Y were. More to the point, we are left wondering what
the implicit judgments of Professor Ys narrator are. We cannot
deconstruct oppressive domination without an implicit account of
truth and freedom. ° This, essentially, was Fran Olsen's point in
response to Frankenberg: we need to ask and be explicit about what
those underlying normative commitments are, or else we have no
way of judging them and criticizing them. 2 Her comment could be
applied generally to a number of the projects discussed at this conference. Following one presentation, a very insightful critique of
certain decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the first
question was, "How then are you judging what is illegitimate power
and what is legitimate authority?"
In this light, the New Approaches' self-conscious and explicit
treatment of the normative stance of comparative law could prove to
be more significant than it first appeared. Its significance depends,

20. Charles Taylor makes this point brilliantly in his critique of Michel
Foucault, a master of the hermeneutics of suspicion if ever there was one. See
Charles Taylor, Foucault on Freedom and Truth, in FoUcAULT: A CRITICAL READER
69 (David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986). Among other things, Taylor points out how
Foucault's 'monolithic relativism" also leads to 'total incomparability" across history
and culture.
21. Frances Olsen, The Drama of Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 275.
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however, on recognizing also the dynamic structure of the comparative lawyer's cognitive processes. We should no doubt articulate our
prior conceptual and normative frameworks and critically examine
the way that they give direction to our knowledge, understanding,
and judgment regarding the objects of our study. At the same time,
we must recognize that knowledge, understanding, and judgment is
constitutive of our ever-evolving conceptual and normative frameworks. Let me point to a more concrete example: Brenda Cossman's
description of how her studies of India led her to turn a comparative
gaze back on herself and to reevaluate the categories of thought she
had been using at home cogently illustrates the dynamic process of
comparative analysis.'
To the extent that the New Approaches are able to bring us to
a more critical self-awareness, they also reveal in the end a deeper
and more basic continuity with "old" comparative legal studies. The
value of comparative methods has always been in forcing us into
sympathetic yet critical knowledge of law in another context, thereby disrupting our settled understandings, provoking us to new judgments, and demanding our response with new decisions, commitments, and actions.' If comparative law does not do that, I would
submit that it is hardly worth doing at all. To be sure, it requires
the painstaking work of seeking to know law, language, politics, and
culture in other contexts. But if comparative law is successful in
this respect, there will be many more "new approaches" conferences
in the future that will break with our work by characterizing it as
hopelessly out of touch and that in that rupture will continue the
critical tradition of comparative law of which we are a part.

22. See Cossman, supra note 4.
23. See Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understandings of Work,
Parenthood and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 CAL. L. REV. 531,
535 (1993); Mary Ann Glendon, Comparative Law as Shock Treatment: A Tribute to
Jacob W.F. Sundberg, in SARTRYcK uR: FESTSKRIFT TILL JACOB W.F. SUNDBERG 69,
70 (1993); Gunther Teubner, Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1453 (1992). This process is not limited to comparative law,
of course, but is in important senses merely a particular example of the more general conditions for authentic human knowing. See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, Cognitional
Structure (discussing nature and implications of dynamic structure of human knowing), in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 205 (1988).

